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1. Introduction. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union, accomplished by the August 1991  putsch fatlure 
and formalised in December by the creation of a smaller and looser Commonwealth of 
11  Independent States  1,  paved  the way  for the  unilateral  introduction  by Russia  of a 
stabilization  and  reform  programme on  2 January 1992.  The  programme  had  been 
announced by Boris Yeltsin on 28 October 1991  but would have been incompatible with 
the Draft Economic Union Treaty, then still under discussion, which excluded unilateral 
price  increases  by  individual  republics.  Implementation  was  originally  due  in  mid-
December  but was  postponed  at the  request  of other  republics,  notably  Ukraine.  A 
second round of measures was to follow in  April  1992,  but has been  partially delayed 
because of domestic and republican pressures. 
The Russian package has a great deal in common with the Polish prototype of January 
1990, on which it is modelled.  It was preceded by protracted economic decline, open 
and repressed domestic imbalance and an external payment crisis {Table 1). It includes 
price liberalisation, fiscal and monetary restraint, drastic cuts in real wages, plans for the 
introduction of current account convertibility and projects for the commercialisation and 
privatisation of state enterprises.  It has been accompanied by a burst of hyperinflation 
and recession, poised to continue at lower rates throughout 1992. 
There  are,  however,  a  number  of specific  features  of the  Russian  package,  of the 
Russian  economy and of its relations with the other republics2,  which  deserve further 
investigation.  In  particular,  the  peculiarity of the  Russian  case  is the persistence of a 
rouble zone,  encompassing not only CIS  but the entire former USSR.  The rouble has 
been "nationalised"3 and for the time being is being managed by Russia.  Other ex-Soviet 
republics  have  been  forced  to follow  Russia's  price  rises  but  all  of them,  including 
Ukraine,  are  much  further  behind  in  their transition.  There  are  plans  for  republican 
currencies  but  so  far  other  republics  have  issued  rouble  complements  (rationing 
coupons) which only in Ukraine have become rouble substitutes.  This peculiarity poses 
special  problems  of inter-republican  trade  regime  and  monetary  policy  coordination, 
affecting the progress and costs of Russian stabilization. 
This paper, after a brief review of the Russian programme of January and April 1992 and 
accompanying economic trends (section 2), discusses some specific anomalies of that 
(*) Commission  of the  European  Communities,  Brussels.  The  views  expressed  in  this  paper do not-
necessarily reflect those of the EC Commission.  This paper draws partly on a EC Commission report 
prepared jointly  with  Andreas  Papadopoulos  and Rutger  Wissels.  Acknowledgements  are  due  to 
Andrei Vernikov and other Conference participants for helpful comments. 
1. The  CIS (SNG from the Russian initials), established by the Alma Ata and Minsk treaties of December 
1991, does not include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Georgia. 
2. We refer to former USSR members as •republics• in spite of  their declared preference for •states• when 
ambiguities  would  otherwise  arise,  for instance  using  •state  currency- or •state  trade• instead  of 
•republican currency• and •republican trade•.  Both authors are citizens of  countries which are proud to 
be called republics.  1 
3. This is the vivid·though unorthodox expression used by Alexei Mozhln at  a recent Conference on •Inter-
state economic relations•, Brussels, February 1992.  See Gros eta/., 1992. -2-
programme and related problems of implementation (section 3); stresses some adverse 
structural  features  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  (section  4);  raises  questions  of 
interrepublican  economic  relations  (section  5),  and  especially  of monetary  and  trade 
regimes (sections 6 and 7 respectively).  All these factors are bound to increase the cost 
of stabilization  and  transition  relatively  to  that  of  similar  programmes  in  other  post-
communist countries; section 8 draws some implications for Western assistance. 
2.  The Russian programme: implementation and performance. 
The January package 
The measures taken in January included: 
price liberalisation  except for a number of goods and  services  such as  basic 
foodstuffs, transport, health and education, energy and fuels, subject to a 25 per 
cent  ceiling  on  trade  margins.  Prices  were  expected  to  increase  in  the  first 
quarter by 200-250 per cent as a result; 
drastic reduction of product subsidies; 
adoption of a quarterly state budget aimed at reducing the deficit to 1 per cent of 
GNP,  through  both  expenditure  cuts  (defense,  investment,  subsidies)  and 
additional fiscal revenues; 
introduction of VAT on most goods (not imports) at a 28 per cent rate, reduced 
to 15 per cent for some goods in mid-February; 
unification of profit tax at a 32 per cent rate and the rise of pay-roll tax to 37 per 
cent, with wages in excess of four time the minimum wage taxed also as profits; 
new or hi~her excises; the temporary abolition of most imports tariffs and a new 
export tax ; 
pre-payment of 90 per cent wage increases in part compensation of anticipated 
inflation ahead of price liberalisation, and plans for a safety net for the new poor 
and unemployed; 
monetary restraint,  with  a 15  per cent target increase  of commercial credit in 
nominal terms (i.e.  an  expected contraction in  real  terms of the order of 62-67 
per cent), through the rise of reserve ratios from 0.02 to 0.20 and the imposition 
of non-interest-bearing deposits on commercial banks; 
a rise in the discount rate from 5 to 20 per cent; 
a medium term programme for the commercialisation and privatisation of state 
enterprises, through distribution of free shares to employees (20 per cent of the 
total subject to an  individual limit of 20 months minimum wage;  plus another 10 
per cent of shares at a discount) and sales to the public and foreign investors. 
4. The export tax is on individual commodities not values; it is fixed in ECU per physical unit and is paid in 
roubles. -3-
The April round 
On  27  February 1992 the  Russian  government adopted "Guidelines for the economic 
policy  of  the  Russian  Federation  .. ,  for  implementation  in  April;  IMF  officials  were 
consulted and the programme was finalized at mid-March and submitted to the IMF at 
the end of March.  The second package was intended to include the following measures. 
Prices.  All  remaining  restrictions on consumer prices will  be abolished by the 
end  of March,  except for rents,  catering  and  public transport;  bread  and  milk 
may be  regulated by local authorities.  Raw  material and energy prices will  bf· 
liberalised immediately but subject to an  export tax, which will progressively be 
phased out between mid-April and the end of 1993. At first crude oil price will be 
raised  sixfold to R 2000-2500 per tonne,  i.e one-third of world market prices5. 
April inflation should rise to 50-75 %; strict monetary and incomes policies would 
slow down inflation to a monthly rate of 1-3% in  the last quarter,  expected to 
total  100-140%  for  the  last  three  quarters  of  1992  (compared  to  145%  in 
January-December 1991  and an additional 350% which is now expected for the 
first quarter of 1992). 
Wages.  Wages  are to be liberalised,  however subject to high and progressive 
taxation  on  excess  wage  bills  over  and  above  central  Guide-lines  in  stat(; 
enterprises  (private  enterprises are  exempt);  salary  increases of civil  servants 
are to be held within 70 per cent of wage increases in state enterprises. 
The state budget.  A deficit of 10 per cent  ~f GOP in the first quarter should bE' 
reduced to zero in the last quarter of 1992  .  Subsidies, currently 5% of GDf"'. 
and  administrative  expenditure  should  be  reduced;  imports will  be  subject to 
VAT and tariffs at a single rate  of 15  per cent from  1 July  1992,  a unified tax 
regime  will  be  introduced for  exports  of raw  materials  and  energy  product~  .. , 
additional  taxation  at  an  average  rate  of 50  per  cent  will  be  introduced  on 
domestic consumption of oil and gas.  Local authorities will have the right to levy 
additional taxes.  Credit financing  of budget deficits by local authorities will  be 
restricted by the government and the Russian central bank; credit financing of 
the Federation budget deficit by the central bank is not to exceed 2% of GOP. 
Monetary  policy.  Credit  expansion  will  be  kept  within  the  range  set  by 
anticipated inflation and the target increase in reserves.  The increase in central 
bank credit to commercial banks will be set administratively; the credit ceiling for 
the first quarter is  15%.  Minimum reserve requirements will  be imposed on all 
commercial  banks,  including the  Russian  savings  bank,  at rates to be  raised 
gradually to 20%.  The government will raise the interest rate on its debt in April; 
commercial banks will be free to set their interest rates. 
Exchange rate policy.  Multiple exchange rates will be simplified at first, with only 
two rates the end of April: a floating rate for all current account transactions and 
a stronger fixed rate for capital transactions.  The floating rate will be maintained 
until stabilisation and reserve accumulation allow a change of regime. 
In  order to  introduce  current  account  convertibility,  enterprises  will  gradually 
surrender their entire export revenues to the  central bank at the  market rate. 
From  15  March there  will  be  more frequent  currency  auctions  by  authorised 
banks and interbank transactions, banks will be allowed to hold open positions 
and restrictions on customer transactions will be abolished. 
5. At a 50 roubles per dollar exchange rate. 
6. The deficit of  the first quarter would be higher if  measured according to international standards. -4-
Trade policy.  Export quotas and licences will  be abandoned from 1 July 1992 
except for  energy  products,  for  which  export  quotas  will  be  set  taking  into 
account domestic consumption requirements and will be gradually reduced until 
complete liberalisation by the end of 1993. 
Incomes policy.  A progressive tax will be introduced on wage bill increases only 
in state enterprises, at 100% for increases up to 1% over a yet unspecified limit, 
200% up to 2% and 400% for increases over 2% above the limit. 
Social  policy.  Employees  made  redundant  by  restructuring  or  closures  will 
receive 90% of their average earnings for 6 months and thereafter 75%  of the 
minimum  wage.  All  other  unemployed  will  receive  the  75%  minimum  wage 
allowance from the start of unemployment.  (At present the unemployed are paid 
benefits equal to their full average salary for three months, gradually falling to the 
minimum wage over the following 12 months). 
Privatisation.  Mass privatisation should start at the beginning of 1993, based on 
the distribution of vouchers to the population and  shares to employee and  on 
general  sales  including  foreign  investors for which  current  restrictions  will  be 
greatly  reduced.  Privatisation  will  include  the  land  on  which  enterprises  are 
located.  Unfinished  construction  will  be  privatised  and  enjoy  favourable  tax 
treatment.  Forms of collective  ownership will  be  possible only  in  exceptional 
circumstances. 
Although the programme was  submitted to the IMF at the end  of March,  subsequent 
parliamentary debates and pressures from other republics have led the government to 
postpone price liberalization until June at the earliest, to relax  ceilin~s on credits to ailing 
state  enterprises  and  to  raise  the  level  of  pensions.  Vice-pnme  minister  Gaidar 
announced in  early in April that the balanced budget target had to be abandoned and 
that the government was aiming at a deficit target of 5% of GDP. 
First results 
In January 1992 prices in Russia rose immediately by the expected 200-250 per cent; the 
free price of the dollar rose from 110 to mid-January peaks of 230 roubles.  In February 
the rouble strengthened and the monthly rate of inflation fell  to around 40  per cent.  A 
shortage of banknotes, already emerging at the end of 1991 , developed as  a result of 
high inflation  (which had reached  145 per cent within  1991) and of political arguments 
holding  down  the  printing  of  banknotes  and  their  delivery  to other  republics.  The 
payment of wage  increases granted ahead  of the January price  increases was  partly 
postponed  to the  end  of February.  This  ~elayed wage  increase,  together  with  the 
unblocking of 80  bn  frozen  rouble  deposits , can  be  expected to refuel  inflation  and 
weaken the free rate of exchange of the rouble in March. 
The target budgetary deficit of 1 per cent of GDP in the first quarter was not reached; low 
rates of tax collection (see below) and sustained expenditure levels (among other things 
due to wage increases have brought the deficit to about 10 per cent of GDP. This is still 
be a considerable achievement in comparison with a 20-25% of GDP deficit in 1991. 
The expected and observed rate of inflation was much higher in January than the rates 
experienced  at  the  inception  of  stabilization  programmes  in  other  post-communist 
7. The unblocked deposits were part of  the compensatory payment made to depositors 1991 following the 
2 April 1991 price ·rise.  The  compensation amounted to '40 per cent of deposits· and was originally 
intended to become liqui(l in 1994.  Otit of  the 156 bn roubles credited to depositors on that occasion, 
40 bn roubles had been unfrozen already in 1991. -5-
economies (Table 2).  It may seem excessive also because in 1991  open inflation should 
have  virtually  eliminated  the  rouble  overhang,  defined  as  the  difference  between  the 
supply and demand for broad money in a shortage economy with administratively fixed 
prices  (see  Nuti,  1989).  The  detection  and  measurement  of monetary  overhang  are 
always  controversial  because  shortages  may  coexist  with  excess  supply  for  some 
products and because the estimate of demand for money is a matter of modelling and 
conjecture;  moreover,  there  is  considerable  uncertainty  about the  quantity  of rouble 
monetary assets.  According to the  IMF  (IMF  et al.,  1991) the overhang  ("involuntary 
savings")  amounted to 170  bn  roubles  at the end  of 1990 (Table  3)8.  Computing the 
rouble overhang at the end  of 1991  assuming that the real  value of voluntary savings 
remained constant yields an estimate of -95.3 bn roubles; this is impossible, because it 
would imply involuntary expenditure, but suggests nevertheless a drastic reduction and 
possibly the elimination of the overhang by end 1991, in spite of the very significant rise 
in savings and the compensations for price rises granted by the Pavlov government to 
holders of savings deposits. 
Several other factors may have been responsible for high inflation: restrictive sales policy 
by  monopolistic  producers  and  traders;  cost-push  inflation  arising  from  the  90% 
December wage increase, the introduction of VAT, the removal of subsidies and rises in 
administrated energy prices (400%) accompanied by a more accommodating monetary 
policy than intended in the programme; a reduction in the demand for money due to the 
fall in  real interest rates; and also self-fulfilling hyperinflationary expectations, reinforced 
by  official  announcements  and  forecasts9.  Not all  these factors  were  unavoidable.  It 
therefore seems that part of the January inflation outburst could have been avoided. 
The price rise was not, and was not expected to be, accompanied by a positive supply 
response.  A  disturbing  feature  of  Russian  stabilization,  however,  is  the  lack  of 
widespread availabil_ity of goods and services at the higher prices, of the kind that was 
established  in  a  matter  of days  in,  say,  Poland  or Bulgaria  at  the  inception  of their 
programmes.  In  spite of recent improvements there are still  some queues,  and shops 
appear to have small inventories on offer: a consumer's life is still far from "normal".  This 
may be due to factors such as a dispersed and underprovided distribution network; the 
probably negative supply response of monopolistic producers; the depletion of stocks 
due to the early preannouncement and delay of price increases, and the award of wage 
compensatory increases ahead  of price liberalisation.  It could also  be a symptom of 
underlying hyperinflationary trends, i.e. a generalised lack of confidence in the currency. 
Finally,  Russia ·does  not  seem  to  have  experienced  an  increase  in  unemployment 
associated with output falls. GNP, which officially fell by 2 per cent in 1990 and by some 
15  per  cent  in  _1991,  is  expected  to  fall  in  1992  by  10-15  per  cent  (government 
"Guidelines ... ")  but this rate  may well  have been  exceeded already in  the first quarter. 
Russian  registered  unemployment is  still  being  quoted by  officials  as  standing  at  the 
November level  of 51,000,  though Social  Affairs  Minister Shokin  10  has  predicted that 
Russian unemployment may grow from the 500,000 units at the end of 1991 to as much 
as  2 mn by the end of the year in  the absence of western assistance.  The apparent 
resilience  of  Russian  employment  is ·,to  be  contrasted  with  the  much  more  rapid 
response of other post-communist countries, where employment fell more rapidly. 
t  /L 
8. Of these 110 bn roubles were considered the consequence of 1985-90 macroeconomic developments, 
and 60 bit  wer~  judgml)ntally attributed'  to long-standing micro-rationing. Other estimates were in the 
110-260 bn rouble range (see Vavilov and Vjugin,  1992}. 
9.  In  December  199 'J.  official~ repeatedly  quotec(, a  250%  price  rise  forecast.  Enterprises  used  to 
administered -price  reform$~  may have taken this forecast as an official instruction to rise prices. It Is 
reported  that in  Ukraine.  vel)l.  detailed price 'forecasts'  for individual products were  published by 
branch ministries. 
10. In a speech given in London In mid-February 1992. -6-
3.  Specific aspects of the Russian programme. 
The Russian programme represents a clear break with the past and a bold attempt to 
move towards a fully fledged market economy. It shares the basic merits and drawbacks 
of the Polish approach; it also has a number of specific features, whose wisdom is open 
to question.  On the positive side, the programme has the merit of having abandoned, at 
long last, a misguided commitment to hold down prices administratively in the face of the 
cumulative impact of many years of fiscal and monetary indiscipline.  Moreover, there is 
an attempt to establish the fiscal and monetary discipline necessary to contain the initial 
price  increase  and  prevent  its  transformation  into  an  inflationary  spiral,  which  would 
jeopardise  the  orderly  establishment  of  markets,  recovery  of  supplies  and  the 
resumption of growth. 
The January package does not include the current account convertibility typical of the 
Polish  approach,  but suggests the  possibility of its  introduction subject to substantial 
western assistance; the April package confirms this prospect and indicates a policy first 
of  floating  then  of fixed  rates.  With  the  benefit  of  hindsight  the  postponement  of 
convertibility  may  prove  more  damaging  than  it  might  have  been  anticipated. 
Convertibility  would  enhance  competition;  .. import..  a  price  structure  and  avoid  the 
distortions of multiple exchange rates and of a severely undervalued free rate;  prevent 
the supply disruptions due to intermediate goods producers switching from  domestic 
users to exports in search for foreign exchange; provide a clear reference for the pricing 
of interrepublican trade;  reduce  if not avoid capital flight.  If credibly was established, 
convertibility would restore confidence in money thus holding down the rate of inflation 
(see Vernikov, 1992). 
Other  features  of the  programme  are  debatrble;  they  are  not  part  of the  standard 
approach but are specific departures from it  1  .  For a start, while the postponement of 
convertibility was imposed by the lack of western support for the time being, there is no 
justification for the preservation of a wide range of multiple exchange rates.  At the end of 
January  1992  one  US$  was  converted  into:  5.4  roubles  for centralised  imports,  110 
roubles for the compulsory surrender of 1  0 per cent export revenues (intended for the 
creation of a reserve fund), 55 roubles for the compulsory surrender of 40 per cent for oil 
and  raw  materials  export revenues  (to  finance  a debt service  fund);  117  roubles  for 
tourist transactions; 110-160 for purchases by Russian citizens (up to 200 US$ a year, a 
limit often waived by banks,  at a price);  230  roubles in  small scale auctions of foreign 
exchange to Russian producers.  At the same time rates were under discussion of 8-1 0 
roubles for western investors and their participation in  Russian privatisation,  and 20-30 
roubles for the conversion of world prices  in  inter-republican trade.  This benchmark, 
which  is  also  the  target  indicated  for  a fixed  exchange  rate  in  1992,  is  based  on  a 
purchasing power parities approach to exchange rate determination. If only for reasons 
of consistency, convenience, diffusion of world price information, exchange rates should 
have been unified without further delay.  At most a free and a controlled rate might have 
been allowed temporarily.  None too soon,  exchange  rate  unification  is  envisaged for 
implementation in April 1992. 
Persistent disagreements between the government and the Russian central bank- which 
is not answerable to government but to parliament - over the objectives and the conduct 
of economic policy have rendered monetary policy a weak element of the overall reform 
package.  After  the  central  bank  had  initially  refused  to  support  macroeconomic 
11. Some detatable features  of the Russian programme are common to other Polish-style programmes: 
the abatement of import duties, which then had to be restored as in Poland; the excessive devaluation 
of the free exchange rate; the two-stage price liberalisation, potentially inflationary through its impact 
on expectations and wage claims; an inadequate wages policy, first allowing an excessive drastic fall 
in  real  wages  and then  attempting  to  contain  wage  claims  through  ineffectual  taxation  of excess 
wages. -7-
stabilization,  it claims to have changed course radically in  January,  and to have  set a 
very restrictive ceiling for credit expansion in line with the government's policy stance. 
There are remaining drawbacks, however. The notion that monetary restraint might be 
implemented by holding back the supply of banknotes is  most peculiar:  every known 
monetised economy may control the total quantity of money but must leave to the choice 
of  the  public  and.  banks  the  volume  of  banknotes  and  coins  in  circulation;  the 
subsequent necessary reduction of the artificial banknote shortage only contributes to 
refuel inflation.  The  parallel unfreezing of rouble deposits (see  above) will  have made 
impossible the achievement of planned monetary restraint. 
The  Russian  programme avoids the  Polish  extreme  of raising  interest immediately to 
positive real rates and of imposing the higher rates not only on new contracts but also on 
old loans, amounting to a questionable tax on liabilities.  However the programme goes 
to  the  opposite  extreme  of  holding  real  interest  rates  to  down  to  numerically  high 
negative levels  12. 
The preannouncement of price rises long before their actual occurrence - several times 
in 1991, then ahead of the January liberalisation - will  have c;Jepleted  stocks completely 
through speculative purchases. 13 This phenomenon will  have been  aggravated by the 
award of compensatory wage increases long before price rises: while the protection of 
minimum  levels  of real  wages  might  well  require  substantial  money  wage  increases 
together with price increases, their pre-payment has adverse effects on the depletion of 
inventories and has no justification. 
The replacement of the 5 per cent sales tax by a Value Added Tax was,  in principle, a 
good idea;  with  due preparation  it  could  have  been  implemented  in  due course.  In 
Russian  circumstances  this  VAT  risks  being  treated  as  a  cascade  sales  tax, 
circumvented through barter transactions,  ignored or evaded, while levied at a punitive 
rate  when  observed.  Indeed,  preliminary figures  from the first quarter indicate a very 
significant shortfall in tax revenue. 
It is  understandable that large scale privatisation of state enterprises might take some 
time;  however there  seems  to  be  no justification  for the  further  delay  of small  scale 
privatisation  of  housing,  land  plots,  retail  and  catering  establishments,  buildings  and 
chunks of redundant equipment.  While the Yavlinsky-Shatalin 
11500-Days  ..  Programme of 
September  1990  was  unrealistic  in  expecting  privatisation  to  make  a  significant 
contribution  to  stabilization  (Commission  of the  EC,  1990),  the  current  programme 
postponement is a move to the opposite extreme. 
4.  Specific structural features of the former Soviet Union. 
An assessment of the Russian programme should consider not only its specific features, 
reviewed  above,  but also  a number of specific structural features of the former Soviet 
Union.  Among these, the only feature favourable to Russia is the production and export 
of  oil.  -However  Russia  seems  to  have  suffered  from  an  earlier  Soviet  Dutch-style 
disease, namely the dilapidation of oil revenues and of oil-revenue backed loans used to 
sustain  ·excessive  domestic  absorption  and  to  maintain  an  otherwise  no~  viable 
12. After the January price rise ex ante real rates will have risen with respect to December, but  are still very 
significantly negative; however during January current actual real rates will have fallen instead. 
13. It may be argued that it was politically necessary for a government committed for so long to price 
stability to announce its change of policy.  However there was no need to announce the actual dates 
and the decided or  predicted price levels. -8-
economic system14. Today Russia has costly marginal supplies of oil and gas, shrinking 
output and exports, with still large but very rapidly falling deliveries to the other republics. 
This gives considerable bargaining power to Russia in negotiations with other republics 
(see sections 5 and 6) but does not reduce the opportunity cost of domestic oil uses and 
therefore does ease the task of energy saving and capacity restructuring in Russia. 
All  the  other specific structural features  of the ex-Soviet/Russian  initial  conditions are 
unfavourable.  First, the collapse of the two pillars of the Soviet state - the communist 
party and its command structure parallel to state organs, and the central organs of the 
Union  organs  - has  implied  devolution  of some  state  powers  to large  cities  and  to 
republics  ~ut also a net loss of state power.  This is visible through the collapse of tax 
collection  1  and the current difficulties with the enforcement of compulsory surrender of 
part of export earnings. 16 It is also visible through the manifest rise of organised interest 
groups  appropriating  state  assets  and  privileges  - all  phenomena  falling  under  the 
Russian label of "Mafia" but encompassing much more than organised crime, which is 
also on the rise. 
In  spite  of the  significant Russian  reliance  on  private food  supplies in  the  kolkhozian 
market,  there  is  no significant tradition  of private  enterprise,  no  private  ownership  in 
agriculture wholesale  or retail  trade.  In  agriculture privatisation  has affected  no more 
than one per cent of cultivable land and there are still ideological and legal obstacles to 
private  ownership.  Wholesale  trade  is  being  conducted  by  various  commodity 
exchanges,  still  fairly  small  scale  (the  largest,  Moscow Commodity  Exchange,  has  a 
turnover of 5 bn  roubles a month); retail  outlets are either parts of large scale trading 
state  enterprises,  or parts  of production  enterprises  catering  for  the  needs  of  their 
employees: both kinds of outlets are difficult to commercialise and privatise.  The large 
growth  of the  non-state  sector,  now  totalling  7.5  mn  employees,  is  almost  entirely 
accounted for by the so-called cooperative sector, about 85 per cent of which represents 
offshoots of state enterprises founded to circumvent price and income ceilings and limits 
to the conversion of bank money into cash. 
The  weight  of  the  state  sector,  largest  amongst  all  post-communist  countries,  is 
aggravated by the large size of the military complex, at the same time hoarding (and now 
disposing to its own advantage) valuable resources and administering worthless plants. 
It has been found (Hare and Hughes, 1991) that in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
the  proportion  of  1989  industrial  output  yielding  negative  value  added  at  1990 
international prices is of the order of 20-25 per cent.  Duch~ne  and Senik-Leygonie (1992) 
estimate this proportion to be of the order of 12%,  but the high incidence of the military 
complex and of heavy industry, and their relative concentration in  Russia, might make it 
closer to the higher bound of the range found for CEECs. 
Among  the  legacies  of  central  planning  in  the  ex-Soviet  area  there  is  extreme 
concentration of output, by enterprises and their associations, and by republics. Adverse 
implications of these structural feature are monopolistic price and output behaviour after 
liberalisation,  and  the  cascade  supply  multiplier  effects  of  republican  recession  and 
increasing  barriers  to  inter-republican trade  (see  below).  The  overall  degree  of inter-
republican  trade  openness,  specialisation  and  mutual  dependence,  is  very  high  in 
general but is asymmetrically low for Russia and  Kazakhstan. Conversely, openness to 
world trade is low and, on the export side, concentrated on oil and raw materials where 
14. The  Soviet variant of the disease differs slightly from the classical case,  i.e. non-competitiveness of 
non-oil exports due to an over-valued rate of  exchange boosted by oil exports. 
15. The Soviet rate of tax collection is reported to have fallen from 80 per cent of expected revenues in 
February 1991 to 17 per cent in September 1991.  In Russia this rate appears to have improved after 
stabilization but is still unsatisfactory.  For instance, on 26 January 1992 Deputy Premier Yegor Gaidar 
complained that from 20 January VAT had been abolished in the Russian republic of Buryatia, tt  the 
same time applying for subsidies from the Russian budget. 
16. Capital flight has been estimated to have been of  the order of  US$ 14 bn in 1991 (/IF,  1992). -9-
either supply difficulties prevail (e.g. oil)  or exports from the ex-Soviet area drive prices 
down in an already depressed world market (e.g. aluminium, nickel, uranium). 
A most important structural feature of the post-Soviet scenario is the continued existence 
of a rouble zone,  and the precarious arrangements (discussed below in greater detail) 
that at present see Russian control of the money supply - essential for the success of the 
programme - potentially disrupted  by republican  expansion  of rouble  substitutes and 
credit.  Russian stabilization and reform includes therefore the coordination of republican 
monetary and fiscal policies, a smooth transition to republican currencies and a coherent 
framework of operation for a rouble  Zone that is  likely to remain  in  operation  still  for 
sometime. 
Last but not least, there is the sheer size of the ex-Soviet economy.  The level reached by 
Soviet GNP  is  now regarded  by western  and  Russian  sources  as  much  lower than 
previously understood; estimates of the 1989 Soviet total GNP have fallen from  51  per 
cent of the US level (the geometric mean of ratios of 66 per cent at dollar prices and 39 
per cent at rouble prices) to 43 (CIA), 28 (Aslund) and 25 per cent (Soviet estimate), right 
down to 10 per cent in recent successive revisions. However in terms of population, the 
maintenance of minimum consumption  levels,  the  restructuring  of existing  productive 
capacity,  the  tasks  are  still  very  large.  Just as  the  tasks  of central  planning  were 
regarded  as  growing  with  the  square  or perhaps  with  the  cube  of the  size  of the 
economy to be  planned,  it  can  be  argued  that the transition  of a formerly  centrally 
planned  economy also  increases  more than  proportionally with  size;  if nothing  else, 
attracting to the  ex-Soviet  amounts of foreign  investment comparable to that already 
attracted or plausibly expected for the smaller countries of central  and eastern Europe 
appears an immense task. 
These adverse structural features have a number of significant implications: a relatively 
higher cost of transition,  with  respect to other post-communist countries; the need to 
tailor the standard stabilization package to Russia's special position within CIS; the need 
for western technical assistance and large scale financial conditional support. 
A low and  sluggish  supply response  is  to be expected,  more so than  in  comparable 
economies; action is required more urgently to close down as  soon as possible those 
activities which  do not yield  a positive value  added,  and  at the same time to protect 
through temporary tariffs and subsidies those activities which although unprofitable still 
produce sizeable positive value added.  Privatisation, which in comparable countries has 
already proven  much slower than anticipated,  appears to  be  at the  same  time  more 
urgent and more difficult, except for small scale privatisation, that should be speeded up. 
The  understandable  anxiety  to  replace  the  old  system  with  private  ownership  and 
enterprise should not lead, during the time unavoidably taken by privatisation and by the 
building  of  the  financial  institutions  necessary  to  make  it  effective,  to  neglect  the 
reorganisation and rationalisation of the state  sector.  The  need to free trade and to 
introduce current account convertibility as soon as feasible appears greater than usual, 
in spite of the adverse circumstances of low elasticity of $Upply and demand.  Finally, 
there is  a need  to establish  a trade  regime that preserves interrepublican  short term 
relative advantages and at the same time is conducive to system reform, and to establish 
a stable  monetary. regime  in  Russia  and the other republics - both temporary for the 
short  term  and  in  a  final  form  for  the  longer  term  - consistent  with  sustained 
interrepublican trade.  The rest of this paper is devoted to these major issues of trade 
and money. 
5.  Inter-republican economic relations 
Since  1990 when  aspirations to republican  independence  began  to be  asserted,  the 
interaction between .. perestroika  .. and republican devolution has been widely investigated -10-
in  western  literature  (see  Commission  of the  EC,  1990;  Havrylyshyn  and  Williamson, 
1991; Williamson,.1991; Gras and  Steinherr,  1991; Gras,  1991;  Braga de Macedo and 
Pisani-Ferry,  1991;  Bofinger,  1992;  Havrylyshyn,  1992).  The  most  debated  issues 
included: whether  devolution was  conducive to  reform,  i.e.  whether  reform  would  be 
better achieved through decisions imposed from the centre or through the competition 
of  republican  regimes;  whether  stabilization  needed  to  and  could  be  coordinated; 
whether  republics  should  form  an  economic  union;  and  whether  and  under  what 
conditions they should retain a single currency. 
The  basic  analytical  framework  of this  discussion,  adapted  from  standard  theory  of 
economic and monetary integration, was that n republics had to choose whether or not 
to coordinate their policies and to assign policy functions to the Union. This literature has 
failed to take into account that Russia was not just a larger than average republic: the 
power  struggle  between  the  Russian  and  the  Union  leaderships  ended  with  the 
disappearance of the Union, Russia has restored its historical position and has become 
again the centre of the post  -Soviet area. 
This new situation is the result of Gorbachev's failure to secure consensus on a reformed 
Union, a possibility already problematic before the failed  putsch and totally discredited 
afterwards;  the  formal  dissolution  of the  Union  was  also  instrumental  in  eliminating 
Gorbachev from  the  political  scene.  Moreover,  for  Russia  the  costs  of interrepublic 
coordination  probably  exceeded  benefits.  Strategically,  it  was  time  for  Russia  to 
abandon the  fiction  of equal  and  sovereign  republics;  economically,  stabilization  and 
reform  could  no  longer  be  delayed  awaiting  the  build  up  of  Union-wide  consensus; 
politically, the  Russian  leadership was  bound to give  priority to the welfare  of its  own 
constituencies.  As  a Russian  policy-maker forcefully  put it,  the  choice  between shock 
therapy and gradualism could not be made at th~ negotiating table, but had to be made 
by elected leaders responsible before the voters  1  . 
The  Russian  takeover  of the  former  Union  has  brought fundamental  changes  in  the 
nature  of the  inter-republican  game,  by  narrowing  the  options  open  to independent 
states,  now  confronted  with  a  fait  accompli.  Radical  reform  has  been  undertaken 
unilaterally by Russia; other states now must either follow or protect themselves from the 
consequences of Russian policies.  After Russian price liberalisation,  other states must 
either follow  or close  their  borders.  Russia  has  taken  over the  former  Gosbank  and 
manages the formerly Soviet rouble;  other states now must choose between individual 
participation in  the Russian  rouble zone,  and the introduction of a republican currency. 
The issue is now not whether republics will cooperate or be coordinated by the centre, 
but whether they will  individually participate  in  some form  of economic and  monetary 
cooperation zone centered on Russia. 
What  was,  and  still  remains,  undecided  was  whether  a  new  leader  -followers  pattern 
would replace coordination among formally equal states, or whether the demise of the 
Union would soon lead to a complete disintegration of the Soviet area.  Clearly,  Russia 
intended -and  still  intends- to take the leadership,  if only because it is interested in the 
welfare of the 25  million Russians living in  other states.  The other states· would gain full 
political  sovereignty  and  could  implement  reform  at  different  paces,  but  they  would 
continue to follow its  lead  and  to remain  in  its  area of influence.  This was  in  fact  the 
rationale behind the takeover of Union institutions and the very purpose of the CIS. 
However,  the  CIS  barely  exists  and  the  viability  of  any  inter-republican  economic 
arrangement is open to question. For the states, the basic question is whether they have 
a short run  economic  interest in  remaining  in  a Russian-led  economic and  monetary 
zone. This depends on the nature of each state's trade links with the rest of the former 
Union,  on  its  commitment to reform,  as  well  as  on  the economic performance of the 
Russian-led  zone.  For  Russia,  the  basic question  is  what  price it  is  ready to pay for 
17. Alexei Mozhin at the LSE inter-republican conference, October 1991. - 11-
economic  leadership  through  the  acceptance  of  some  constraints  on  its  policy 
autonomy, protracted provision of oil  and raw  materials at subsidized  prices,  and the 
sharing  of  seigniorage  revenues  with  the  other  members  of the  rouble  zone.  The 
contradiction between Russia's aspirations to leadership and its very limited resources in 
the short term is at the heart of most recent inter-state developments. 
lnterrepublican agreements are in any event bound to be difficult to design, negotiate, 
and  enforce.  Coordination  costs  are  probably  so  high  that  stable  interrepublican 
agreements might be out of reach for the new states alone. The issue the international 
community  has  to  face  is  therefore  it  should  be  ready  to  pay  for  the  costs  of 
coordination,  i.e.  whether  it should  provide  incentives to conclude such  agreements, 
assist in their design, and monitor their implementation. 
Reform in other states 
Russia's new policy course has left most other states in disarray. After feeble attempts to 
delay the January price liberalization, they passively followed  Russia's bold move and 
implemented without major changes the new Russian price and tax legislation. However, 
the command system is generally still in place through the dominant role of state orders; 
plans for reform,  if any,  are still at a very preliminary stage.  Even  in Ukraine, one of the 
strongest and  most  independence-minded  states,  authorities  have  initially  reacted  to 
Moscow's new policy course in  a passive and frequently perverse way.  It has followed 
price  liberalization  and  tax  reform,  but  implementation  was  inadequate:  price 
liberalization was  in fact largely interpreted as an  administrative price reform,  and VAT 
was  implemented  as  a  cascade  sales  tax.  Ukraine  has  also  taken  steps  towards 
introducing its own currency with the issue of multi-use coupons, but the way in which 
this was done has had very damaging effects (see below). 
The  March annoucement by Russia that energy prices would  be fully  liberalized on  1 
rvlay has given rise to strong protest~  by the other states, which have appealed to Russia 
to delay this measure until October  1  (at the time of writing it seems likely to be delayed 
until summer). Ukraine has also drawn up plans to urgently introduce its own currency in 
order to  protect  itself  from  the  effects  of Russia's  policy,  a  move  which  has  been 
interpreted as a setback for economic reform. 
In the long run, republics have little choice but to reform their economies. Independence 
will  probably prove to be conducive to reform  because it will  allow tailoring policies to 
local conditions and will foster acceptance by the population of the initial welfare costs of 
transition. But in the short term, independence has added new obstacles on the road to 
reform. Part of the drive to independence was triggered by the belief that it would offer a 
chance to steer clear of the turmoil elsewhere in the Union, and to weather the storm by 
keeping the old system essentially intact. Institutions of statehood are being built on the 
vestiges  of  old  Union  bodies  which  existed  to  execute  detailed  instructions  from 
Moscow. Policy design and implementation are entirely novel tasks for them.  Very few 
people have the required training or experience.  This  makes it exceedingly difficult to 
define  a coherent  strategy for  creating  a market economy on  the  ruins  of a defunct 
planning system. 
18.  The  appeal was  issued  on  2 April by Belarus,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgystan,  Moldova,  Uzbekistan  and 
Ukraine. -12-
6. The trade regime 
The importance of trade is  paramount in  reforming economies of Central and  Eastern 
Europe.  But for the most dependent,  Bulgaria, total exports represent~d 34% of GNP, 
and exports to the Soviet Union and other CEECs 73% of total exports 9.  Yet Ukraine, 
which is  one of the least trade-dependent states  (beside Russia),  is  approximately as 
open, and makes 85% of its exports to the rest of the former Soviet Union. For thirteen 
out of the fifteen former republics, trade with the rest of the world is less than one-sixth of 
total  trade  (Commission  of  the  EC,  1990;  IMF  and  al.,  1991).  Furthermore, 
interdependence is amplified by long-standing supply-side connections arising from the 
organization of production at the all-Union level (Sapir, 1992). 
This pattern of integration is a by-product of central planning and associated policies of 
domestic autarky, as well as artificially low transport costs20.  Liberalisation of prices and 
trade will necessarily redirect trade, probably away from inter-republican to domestic and 
international  outlets.  In  the  short  run,  however,  there  are  temporary  comparative 
advantages and inter-republican complementarities arising from existing capital stocks, 
technical standards and  product lines.  Opportunities of trade with the rest of the world 
suffer  limitations  because  of inadequate  product  ranges  and  differences  iri  technical 
standards. These factors are  of little  importance for trade in  'hard goods' like oil,  raw 
materials, foodstuffs and primary manufactures, which could be relatively easily exported 
to  the  rest  of  the  world,  but  are  of  major  relevance  for  'soft  goods',  i.e.  finished 
manufactures and  processed  food  products.  Furthermore,  producers accustomed  to 
deliver their products according to central  planners'  instructions have  to learn  how to 
behave in a market environment. This  .. learning by doing  .. process could take place more 
smoothly  through  the  initial  replacement  of  traditional  planned  deliveries  by  direct 
interenterprise contracts within the ex-Soviet area. 
These arguments are related to a wider discussion on trade policy during the transition. 
McKinnon  (1991)  has  put  forward  a  strong  argument  in  favour  of temporary  trade 
protection during the transition to the market: while prices can  be changed overnight, 
producers may  need  some time to adapt their capital  stock,  technology and  product 
range  to  the  new  environment;  otherwise,  even  efficient  firms  could  go  bankrupt. 
However the  same  argument does not apply to inter-republican trade,  because firms 
located  in  different  republics  start  from  similar  initial  conditions  and  therefore  can 
compete with each other.  Moreover, as long as restrictions to competition from the rest 
of the world remain  in  place, there is a strong case for maintaining free trade between 
the former republics in order to limit the extent of monopoly power. A case can therefore 
be made for the setting up of an  inter-republican trade framework that would maintain 
trade  links  open  and  foster  the  development  of  enterprise-to-enterprise  trade  while 
granting producers with some degree of protection ·vis-a-vis the rest of the world21 . 
Thus the challenge of inter-state trade policy is to design and implement arrangements 
that will  allow significant  adjustments to take  place  in  the  long  run  as  a result  of the 
transition to a market economy, while preventing in the short run  policy-induced trade 
disruptions that would  result  in  excessively  high  costs to all  the  republics  in  terms  of 
value added lost during the transition.  For this it is essential to move from the present 
system of bilateral barter and state purchases (goszakazy, literally state orders) to direct 
inter-enterprise  trade,  at  the  same  time  avoiding  trade  contraction  due  to  non-
cooperative policies. 
19. See Collins and Rodrik (1991}.  . 
20. Gros and Dautrebande (1992} find that the pattern of trade among the republics is surprisingly similar 
to the prediction of a gravity model of trade.  However,  this only regards the  structure of aggregate 
interrepublican trade flows,  as opposed to both the product composition of trade and the respective 
shares of  interrepublican and international trade. 
21 . For a discussion of principles for inter-republican trade policies,  see Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (1992), 
and Layard and Sapir (1992). (3) 
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Recent trends in inter-republican trade are not encouraging. Even before the dissolution 
of the Union,  a tendency towards bilateral and  barter agreements was apparent. This 
trend accelerated after the failed putsch and led to the negotiation of a matrix of bilateral 
agreements aiming  at preserving existing flows of goods. These agreements generally 
set a target for the total volume of trade and regulate its product composition. In practice 
states are committed to deliver goods at fixed prices, and agreements aim at achieving 
some degree of bilateral balance or pre-set agreed imbalances. The agreements' main 
effect is thus to replicate in a decentralized way the former centrally planned allocation of 
goods - a clear turn for the worse.  Quite naturally, they imply for most states to rely on 
state orders in  order to make sure that promised goods are actually delivered  (Yasin, 
1992). 
These  trade  agreements  are  however  not  easily  enforced,  because  suppliers  give 
priorities to the  domestic market,  exports  to the  world market,  or participate  in  inter-
republican  trade  through  direct  enterprise-to-enterprise  barter  transactions.  These 
moves are frequently encouraged by local or regional authorities aiming at improving the 
region's access to goods and its terms of trade. States often retaliate by requ1ring export 
licenses for inter-republican enterprise transactions or by banning deliveries altogether, 
thereby both limiting the development of market relations and  contributing to a further 
disruption in trade links.  The present pattern of inter-republican trade has therefore been 
equated to an archipelagus of islands connected by narrow bridges. 
The  Russian  government  has  recently  attempted  to reach  an  agreement  on  a more 
market-oriented  trade  regime.  Discussions  were  also  held  at  an  inter-republican 
conference in  Brussels on a draft code of conduct for inter-republican trade (see Gras 
and  al.,  1992).  All  states  are  in  principle  interested  in  meeting this  challenge,  but the 
stake is clearly not the same for all. A very rough measure of the potential cost of trade 
collapse can  be  derived from the volume and  product composition  of inter-republican 
trade. Assuming that hard goods can be sold abroad, the cost of trade collapse for each 
state  would  depend  on  its  exports  of soft  goods,  which  could  not be  sold  on  other 
markets (Table 4)22. While the figures in Table 4 are clearly upper bounds, it is apparent 
that the potential cost of interrepublican trade collapse is relatively small for Russia and 
Kazakhstan, substantial for Ukraine, and huge for all other states. 
Table 4 also indicates the leverage  Russia  can  expect to exert in  bilateral  discussions 
with other states. Asymmetry in these discussions does not arise only from Russia's size 
and limited dependence on exports of soft goods, but also from the fact that a republic's 
relation  with  the other  republics  depends  crucially  on  its  membership  of the  Russian 
rouble zone  (on  this  question and  the  implications  of republican  currencies  see  next 
section). The last column of Table 4 therefore gives the ratio of the state's potential loss 
to that of Russia in the event of withdrawal from the Russian-led zone. It is apparent that 
Russia  has leverage over all  states except Kazakhstan,  especially over Belarus  and  a 
number of other states;  Ukraine appears to be  in  a middle situation,  although  it  has 
clearly more to loose than Russia in a collapse of its trade with the rouble zone. 
In spite of Russia's leverage, however, reaching a trade agreement raises considerable 
difficulties.  First, there is widespread resistance in many other states to the abolition of 
state orders, whether due to reluctance to reform or to heavy dependence on soft good 
exports. Auctioning export licenses,  as Russia intends to do, is  much more easy for oil 
and raw materials than for machinery. The difficulty of designing interim agreements is 
that  they  must  anticipate  tomorrow's  market  system  while  taking  into  account  the 
present realities.  Second, the  independent states are reluctant to accept the essential 
principles  of  multilateral  trade,  in  particular  the  principles  of  non-discrimination  and 
freedom of transit; indeed, some states may be tempted to use the threat of high transit 
22. The cost of trade collapse would also arise from a fall in imports, which can lead to supply disruptions. 
However, hard-currency revenues from exports of hard goods could always be used to buy soft goods 
for dollars from the other states. -14-
levies as  a way to gain leverage in their negotiations with  Russia. Third, enforcing any 
agreement  may  be  extremely  difficult  as  states  are  not members  of GATT  and  are 
presently not subject to any kind  of trade policy discipline23;  moreover, the control of 
state authorities over regional authorities is open to question. 
Getting an  agreement on  a code of conduct for trade and enforcing it may therefore 
prove to be a difficult goal to reach in the absence of international support. This is even 
more  true  as  the  terms  of trade  dispute  interferes  with  the  redefinition  of the  trade 
regime. 
Changing the terms of trade 
Terms of trade have only recently  begun to be  explicitly considered in inter-republican 
negotiations.  It  is  well  known that former Soviet  pricing of tradables  led  to very  high 
implicit cross-subsidies,  P~gsibly amounting to  15%  of GOP  for some  states,  though 
estimates are controversial  . 
The trend towards an  early elimination of implicit subsidies- now made transparent by 
the high free price of dollars, which can be used to measure the opportunity cost of inter-
republican transactions - is very clear, as no state can afford to subsidize .neighbours at 
such a difficult time.  This applies in particular to Russia,  whose implicit transfers to the 
other  states  is  reckoned  to  be  of  the  order  of  5%  to  10%  of  GOP.  The  Russian 
government is under pressure to reestablish command over its resources, both to make 
up for the 25-30% drop in oil production, and to balance the budget. 
A compromise solution was considered, which basically consisted in setting to zero or to 
a  pre-set  limit  inter-republican  deficits  measuring  trade  flows  at  world  prices,  while 
continuing  to  use  domestic  prices  for  trade  invoicing.  This  would  have  been  more 
inefficient than the last stage of CM EA trade arrangements, which involved trade at world 
prices and  settlement  in  hard  currencies.  These  arrangements  led  to a drastic trade 
contraction but at least producers and  users were faced with  actual opportunity costs 
and  settlement was  automatically multilateral.  The compromise described here would 
have  neither  advantage,  it  would  retain  the  drawbacks  of  the  CMEA  regime  and, 
moreover, could only be implemented through state orders. 
The Russian February proposal includes raising the price of basic commodities up to a 
ceiling  closer  to the  world  price:  a  shadow  exchange  rate  would  be  used  for  that 
purpose,  of the  order of 25-30  roubles  for  US$,  but  settlement would  be  in  roubles 
without aiming at pre-set inter-republican trade balances.  This would be a much better 
system, however it is doubtful that such an interim agreement would last for long. Strong 
forces, both micro- and macro-economic, are pushing in the direction of an  early move 
to world prices in inter-republican trade. 
23. A court of  arbitration is to be created in July 1992. 
24.  See  Commission  of the  EC  (1990)  and,  for an  attempt to  measures distortions  in  relative  prices, 
Duchene and Senik  (1992).  Estimates  of inter-republican transfers rely on  the  comparison between 
Soviet domestic and foreign  trade prices (improperly labelled  'world prices') for individual foreign 
trade classification items; this comparison is  open to  criticism, both for soft goods (because of the 
lack  of goods comparability)  and for hard goods  (because of the  fCJrmer  CMEA 's  peculiar pricing 
rules). -15-
7. The monetary regime 
The  early  aspirations  to  republican  independence  had  been  accompanied  in  most 
republics  by announcements  about the  introduction  of national  currencies25.  Before 
stabilization  the  unilateral  introduction  of a  republican  currency  replacing  the  rouble 
would  have  shifted  onto the  other republics the  burden  of rouble  overhang,  causing 
either higher prices or shortages there. The last republic to introduce its own currency 
would  have  born  the  burden  of  any  residual  overhang.  The  understanding  of  the 
aggressive  nature  of  unilateral  introduction  of  national  currency,  the  fear  of  trade 
retaliation by Russia,  the recognition that it would  be a zero-sum game, are the factor 
that may have prevented the introduction of republican currencies before stabilization. 
Only rationing coupons (i.e. rouble complements, for general purchases of consumption 
goods have been introduced before the January stabilization in order to ensure stability 
of supply to local residents. 
In  that context,  the design of a post-Soviet monetary system  has been  discussed  by 
Western  scholars  considering  weather  the  ex-Soviet  republics  should  retain  a  single 
currency,  or  establish  an  alternative  regime  of  exchange  rates  and  payments  with 
national currencies.  Nobody had foreseen that the rouble would be declared to be the 
currency of Russia without ceasing to be that of the other states, and without the central 
bank(s) being subject to precise rules on the issue of currency. 
At the end of 1991  the central bank of Russia - technically a branch of Gosbank - took 
over the Union's Gosbank and all its subsidiaries throughout Russia,  including the Mint 
whose printing facilities happened to be located in Russia. This surprising move was the 
result  of Russian  authorities'  decision  neither to introduce  a republican  currency  (for 
instance through the overprinting of existing banknotes, as it had been suggested), nor 
to attempt a genuine  monetary union  with the  other states26.  As  a result,  the  rouble 
remained legal tender in all other states, while the central bank of Russia is answerable 
to the Russian parliament only, and has no relation whatever with CIS bodies. 
Monetary and foreign exchange regulations issued by the central bank of Russia apply 
only on Russian territory. Republican central banks have no legal obligation to implement 
Russian currency regulations.  Banks located in  different states are therefore subject to 
different reserve requirements, refinancing rates and foreign exchange surrender ratios. 
Exchange rates also differ from one state to another:  at the end of March, the central 
bank of Belarus was selling roubles for dollars with a 10% discount, and at the same time 
obliged  Belarussian  exporters to  surrender their  hard-currency earnings  at  a  rouble-
dollar exchange rate overvalued by some 50%27. 
The  central bank of Russia controls fully the  issue of rouble banknotes - essential for 
wage  payments  and  retail  transactions  - aod  their  distribution  to  other  states.  The 
Russian central bank's failure to ensure adequate deliveries of banknotes to the other 
republics is  due to a number of reasons:  a shortage of banknotes due to unexpected 
hyperinflation,  debates  over  the  scale  of printing,  as  well  as  a  misguided  attempt  at 
holding  down  inflation  through  the  quantity  of banknotes  rather than  the  quantity  of 
money.  The failure  to deliver banknotes to the republics  started  a fierce  controversy 
over "unfairness"  in  the distribution of cash  and the undue appropriation by  Russia of 
seigniorage revenues. 
25. The  Lat in Latvia,  the  Lit in Lithuania,  the  Kroon  in Estonia,  the  Hryvnia  in Ukraine,  the  Marchvili in 
Georgia, the Altyn in Kazakhstan. 
26.  The  first  solution  would  have  implied  Russia  taking  responsibility  for  the  risk  of  initiating  a 
disintegration of the former Union.  The  second had been abandoned after the failure of negotiations 
during the Autumn on the forming of  a •banking union•. 
27. Reuters, 20 March 1992. -16-
Ukraine  reacted  to  the  shortage  of  roubles  by  precipitating  the  transformation  of 
coupons from  rouble complements to rouble  substitutes.  In  January 1992  25%  of all 
wages were paid in  coupons, which in turn were deemed the only legal tender in  state 
shops. This proportion was raised to 75% in March, with the coupon becoming the only 
legal tender for all cash operations. However non cash operations continue to take place 
in  roubles:  all  bank  and  savings  deposits  are  rouble-denominated,  and  coupons 
deposited with  banks  are  accounted for at a fixed  1:1  exchange rate.  Coupons can 
therefore be considered surrogate roubles, whose issue increases liquidity throughout 
the  rou~W  zone.  Other  states  already  use  standard  or  sophisticated  rationing 
coupons  ,  but have  not yet  replaced  the  rouble  by these  multi-purpose  coupons. 
Belarus was recently reported to consider their introduction. 
The regime applicable to bank money and credit is much less clear. The Central bank of 
Russia introduced in  January correspondent accounts for interrepublican payments in 
order to  control  interstate  rouble  flows.  Republics  running  a  current  account  deficit 
therefore must pay interest on their overdraft.  It has however been reported that most 
inter-republican transactions still take place through the traditional all-Union settlements 
system (MFO), which allows direct branch-to-branch interbank transfers. Correspondent 
accounts  are  merely  statistical  records,  and  former  Gosbank  subsidiaries  in  the 
republics, which have been transformed into national central banks, seem to be able to 
extend  unlimited rouble  credit to their governments or the commercial  banks on their 
territory, while  Russia de facto validates this money creation by accepting payments in 
roubles from the other republics. 
The Soviet rouble zone therefore still exists, but it is increasingly fragmented. A measure 
of the present degree of monetary fragmentation is given by the spread of interest rates 
across the former Soviet Union  (Table  5)  : it is  apparent that rates differ by bank and 
location.  In  January,  lending  rates were  as  low as  13% in  Turkmenistan and  reached 
50% in Latvia. On average, rates were about 5 percentage points higher in Moscow than 
in the rest of Russia, where in turn they were 5 percentage points higher than in the other 
CIS states. 
The present system is similar to that prevailing in 1991, when Gosbank was theoretically 
responsible for overall monetary policy, but was not able to enforce agreed ceilings on 
credit extended by the republic central banks  (Aiexashenko,  1992; Vavilov and Vjugin, 
1992). The difference is  minor: in  1991  Gosbank could not refuse to finance republican 
budget  deficits;  the  Russian  Gosbank  today  does  not  have  such  an  obligation  but 
cannot dictate to republican central banks and prevent them from expanding credit.  The 
irony is that the Russian central bank, which was probably the least disciplined of all in 
1991, has now taken responsibility for overall credit policy. 
Without policy  coordination such  a regime  is  inherently unstable.  The  central  bank of 
Russia  can  inflict  an  inflation  tax  and  collect  seigniorage  throughout the  area,  while 
republican central banks can upset its policy stance through republican credit expansion 
and the issue of rouble surrogates.  However there are some countervailing powers: the 
quantity and price of Russian oil deliveries to the republics, some republics' ability to levy 
duties on the transit of Russian trade flows.  If pushed,  Russia could decree or ban on 
inter-republican transactions or decide to introduce its own currency. 
A degree of built-in  stability may  be  ensured  by the  mutual offsetting of the system's 
negative features: the combination of cash shortage and partial inconvertibility of bank 
money  into  cash  results  in  monetary  restraint,  the  barterization  of trade  reduces  the 
spillover effects of credit expansion in one state, and barriers to trade prevent exporters 
28. Lithuania has introduced a system of multi-use coupons, which however supplement the rouble for the 
purchase of a large range of goods. All wage-earners get free coupons with their rouble salary, and 
additional unlimited amounts can be bought at a fixed exchange rate.  The system therefore combines 
rationing and subsidies for basic consumption. -17-
from  circumventing  national  foreign  exchange  regulations.  Nevertheless,  the  danger 
remains  of  Russia's  attempts  at  macroeconomic  stabilization  failing  because  of the 
inherent instability of the  rouble  zone  monetary system,  bound to become more and 
more acute over time. 
When new currencies ? 
Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic states have indicated their intention to introduce national 
currencies in  the coming  months.  Representatives  from the  other states  occasionally 
regard national currencies either as a long-term goal, or as potential retaliation if Russia 
refused  joint decision-making  for the  management of the  rouble zone;  however their 
short-term aim seems to be to remain within the rouble zone29. 
National attitudes towards the introduction of an own currency appear to depend more 
on the importance attached to political independence than on to economic conditions or 
reform plans. On purely economic grounds, a state's determination to introduce an own 
currency should be related to the degree of fulfilment of these conditions: (i) the  wish to 
de-couple its economic and monetary policy from that of Russia; (ii) its exposure to large 
asymmetric shocks - for  instance from  the very  process of stabilization  and  reform  -
requiring real exchange rate adjustments; (iii) its ability to easily substitute trade with the 
rest of the world to trade within the rouble zone. Ukraine (but not the Baltic states) would 
especially qualify on (iii), but has no other compelling economic reasons to take the lead. 
On  (i),  the  least reform-minded  states  should  paradoxically be the  most forthcoming, 
since  a  national  currency  would  allow  them  to  delay  stabilization  and  to  keep  the 
command  economy  in  place  in  spite  of Russian  liberalisation.  On  (ii),  Central  Asian 
republics should  be the  prime  candidates.  The  list of would-be republican  currencies 
should therefore not be considered closed. 
When  will  the  new  currencies  be  introduced  ? An  important  lesson  from  the  recent 
experience  is  that  states  committed  to the  introduction  of a  national  currency  may 
choose  to  proceed  slowly.  Estonia,  for  example,  already  in  Autumn  1990  was 
announcing plans for the early introduction of a national  currency.  Other Baltic states 
have also made early announcements that have not yet been implemented . 
There  are  simple  possible  explanations  for  this  slow  pace.  Once  the  decision  to 
implement monetary autonomy  is  made,  there  may  still  be  good reasons for waiting. 
First,  it takes some time to set up adequate monetary institutions, create the legislative 
and  regulatory  framework  of  monetary  autonomy,  and  possibly  begin  to  build  up 
reserves  (Hernandez-Cata,  1992);  a republican  central  bank used  to be  a provincial 
window  of  Gosbank,  without  experience  of  monetary  policy  and  without  foreign 
exchange reserves.  Second, whatever the long-term benefits of a national currency  l  in 
the  short  run  continued  membership  of the  rouble  zone  gives  access  to low-priced 
energy and raw materials. Russian policy  .. makers have explicitly linked the priclng of oil 
to the  cu~rency.  question, and subsidies of the order of 10% of GOP or more are large 
enough to induce the postponement of national currencies. 
The  passing of time and the inexorable move towards world prices in  inter-republican 
trade, discussed above, are bound to decrease the weight of these arguments. But there 
are  additional reasons for further delaying the switch to a national currency,  from the 
viewpoints of trade, of stabilization and of political economy.  The trade argument is that 
inter  -republican  trade  flows  risk  being  severely  disrupted  by  the  introduction  of new 
currencies,  if these currencies are  not convertible from the outset.  Solutions could be 
found through the setting up of a payments mechanism (Dornbusch, 1992; Gras, 1992) 1 
but since Russia has  much less to lose than  any other state in the disruption of trade 
29. This Is one of  the lessons of  the recent Brussels conferences. See Gros and al. (1992). -18-
links, it can deter other states from taking the initiative of introducing a new currency3°. 
This is the attitude of at least some Russian officials, rejecting solely to expose Ukraine to 
the  risks  of trade  collapse.  States  may  therefore  wait  until  the  rouble  has  become 
convertible and they are themselves in a position to move fast towards convertibility. 
The stabilization argument is based on the desirability of a new currency primarily when 
there are sound reasons for the monetary policy stance to diverge from that of Russia. 
States  might have  wanted  to stabilise  and  introduce a new currency  simultaneously; 
starting- for instance in Ukraine- from a situation similar to that of Russia there is no real 
reason,  now that Russia has already begun, to introduce a new currency at once: it is 
better to wait and see and revive the own currency proposals if Russia should fail. 
Another reason for de-coupling national monetary policy from that of Russia could be the 
need for a real  exchange  rate  devaluation  (because  of the oil  factor),  but in  a highly 
inflationary environment this could be achieved through incomes policy while remaining 
in the rouble zone. 
The  political  economy argument arises from  the fact that,  for  countries  in  the  rouble 
zone,  Russia  provides  a  perfect  scapegoat  for  short-term  reform  costs.  This  was 
apparent  in  January  1992  when  governments  followed  Russia's  move  to  price 
liberalisation.  Governments  may  therefore  have  an  incentive  to  delay  monetary 
autonomy until a large part of the reform costs have been borne. Reform-minded forces 
within state governments can also find an  interest in  shadowing Russia (specially if the 
domestic balance of power does not favour rapid reform), while conservative forces may 
advocate  the  introduction  of  a  national  currency  in  order  to  protect  the  command 
economy from  necessary  change.  Such  positions  were  apparent  in  recent  Ukrainian 
discussions. 
The absolute and relative weight of these arguments may be difficult to assess,  but it is 
important to realize that the time lag before the introduction of national currencies might 
not be just a matter of arranging the printing of banknotes. If so, the management of the 
rouble zone in its present form becomes critical. 
/Wanaging the rouble zone 
Stabilization  can  be  expected  to  render  the  drawbacks  of the  current  system  more 
-'3pparent; in the present context either stabilization is bound to fail because of a tack of 
cverall monetary control, or Russia will have to introduce very tough measures, including 
a ban on inter-republican transactions or the introduction of its own currency. Thus the 
need to nationalise, at least ternporarily, the rouble zone. 
The urgency of stabilization does not leave time to reach an agreement on the principles 
and the institution of the rouble  zone~ in any case those states that intend to introduce 
their own currency would not participate in such an agreement. Yet the states could well 
contribute to excessive  monetary expansion  in  the  coming  months.  Simple  rules  are 
needed  for  the  management  of the  rouble  zone  in  the  short  term,  which  could  be 
implemented immediately and which could ensure i) that states apply identical monetary 
and  foreign  exchange  regulations,  ii)  that the  volume  of money in  circulation  can  be 
controlled, and iii) that the distribution of cash and credit is fair. 
For  the  first  3-6  months,  after  the  launch  of the  programme this  could  be  achieved 
through the implementation of very simple rules.  For example, cash and credit could be 
d~stributed accord:ng to a criterion such as the share of national income in  the overall 
,, ------------
•. /J. For a summary of the debates on the payments union proposals see Gros and a/.  (1992). - 19  -~-
rouble  zone31 .  A moratorium  would  be  needed  on  the  unilateral  introduction  of new 
coupons, and all central banks would have to apply the same reserve requirements and 
foreign  ~xchange regulations.  Such  rules  would  neither be optimal  nor determine the 
overall  policy stance.  Yet they would ensure fairness  in the distribution of seigniorage 
and  in  the access to credit resources.  They could serve as a useful  bridge until  new 
currencies are  introduced and  a more permanent solution is found for the states that 
wish to remain in the rouble zone. 
Such  an  agreement would  lose Russia  its ability to distribute cash discretionarily, and 
part of the seigniorage revenues. But Russia would gain by neutral  ising the threat that its 
stabilization programme might be jeopardized by the other states'  policies.  The  other 
states would lose some leeway but they would gain from Russia's commitment to follow 
clear rules in the distribution of cash and credit. 
Ukraine  and  other  independence-minded  states  will  certainly  resist  a  move  towards 
limiting their monetary policy autonomy. Yet the status quo is  a far worse alternative; 
unilateral measures taken by the Russian  central  bank would certainly be tougher.  All 
states have a clear interest in finding a way to internalise the externalities associated with 
monetary interdependence. The question remains, however, whether an agreement can 
be  reached  on  such  principles  through  direct negotiations  between the  states.  Here 
again,  the  costs  of policy  coordination  are  overwheleming  :  statistical  information  is 
lacking,  states  do not trust each  other,  they disagree  on  the  policy targets,  and  the 
incentives  to  cheat  are  very  high.  Thus,  there  is  a  case  for  direct  international 
involvement  in  the  definition  of  monetary  policy  rules  and  the  monitoring  of  their 
implementation. 
8. Implications for Western assistance. 
Since the Houston summit of 1990, major industrialized countries have been discussing 
the opportunity and the ways to assist reform  in the Soviet area. The West has  been 
fairly generous : according to EC Commission estimates total assistance pledged by the 
international  community  since  mid  1990  amounted  to  $80bn  in  early  1992  Jthis 
assistance had been committed over a number of years, and only partly disbursed)  2. it 
is estimated that about two third of this assistance,  most of which consists in  bilateral 
credits, had or will have an impact on the balance of payments, while the  r~rnaining third 
(technical assistance, maintenance of Soviet troops in  East Germany and German take-
over of former GDR claims on the Soviet Union) does not affect the CIS ability to import. 
A  one  year  debt  deferral  agreement  was  also  concluded  at  end-1991  betvveen 
international creditors and the successor states of the Soviet Union. 
In spite of its impressive size so far the impact of this assistance has been limited.  Until 
the end of 1991, new credits have been largely compensated by a reduction in  private 
banks' exposure. The tied  character of bilateral credits has  reduced flexibility.  Loosely 
coordinated  assistance  has  lacked  the  predictability  needed  to  support  a  reform 
programme.  Industrialized  countries  therefore  need  to  overhaul  their  assistance  to 
economic reform in the post-Soviet area, to enhance coordination and to increase the 
share of untied financial assistance. 
The I  M  F is engaged in preparations for membership of the republics. An agreement on 
Russian membership and a 3% quota was reached at the end of March, and at the same 
tirne an  assistance package of $24bn  (of which some $13.5bn are new commitments, 
31 . See Gros and Pisani-Ferry {1992) for details. 
32.  Three  quarters  of this  amount have  been provided by the  EC  and its  member states,  especially 
Germany. -20-
including  $4.5bn  support from  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank  and  the  EBRD  and  a $6bn 
stabilization fund) was announced. Other states are expected to be granted membership 
in  spring  or  summer  1992.  The  IMF  could  then  undertake  standard  monitoring  and 
financing  operations,  which  in  turn  is  expected  to trigger supplementary  balance  of 
payments  assistance  and  support  to  convertibility  by  Industrialized  countries.  Other 
agencies such as the World Bank and the  EBRD will also begin to operate before the 
end of 1992. Industrial countries therefore tend to rely on the IMF for monitoring reform 
programmes, for providing initial  macroeconomic assistance and  for assessing needs 
for supplementary official assistance. 
IMF  leadership  in  international  macroeconomic  assistance  is  now  fully  established. 
Indeed,  emphasis  and  stabilization  and  conditionality  is  clearly  warranted  in  CIS 
conditions.  The  standard approach  however has  to be  adapted in  order to take into 
account specific features of the post-Soviet situation and to address three critical issues. 
The first is timing:  by the time  IMF assistance becomes available,  Russia will  already 
have passed the most critical stages of its stabilization programme. The second arises 
from the interrepublican dimension: a country-by-country approach is clearly necessary, 
but republics'  financing  needs  depend  on  interrepublican  trade  in  oil  and  other  raw 
materials. "Stabilization in one country" is bound to fail  if  credit expansion in the rouble 
zone cannot be controlled. The third is implementation: adequate programmes are not 
sufficient  if  governments  are  unable  to  implement  them.  The  risks  of  Russian 
fragmentation and the weak administrative capability of republic governments call for a 
careful monitoring of implementation as well as for a tightly coordinated influx of Western 
technical assistance. -21-
Table 1: USSR Main economic Indicators, 1990-91 
Real GNP 
Consumer prices inflation, Dec/Dec 
Households'monetary assets (end-year), percent increase 
General government deficit,% of GNP 
Convertible currencies current account balance, $ bn 
Source : National sources, EC Commission 
1990 
-2.0 
10.0 
16.0 
6.0/10.0 
-7.3 
1991 
-12.0/-17.0 
145.0 
57.1 
20.0/25.0 
-3.1 
Table 2: Immediate inflationary consequences of price liberalisation 
(CPI, percentage change over previous month) 
Poland January 1990 
CSFR January 1991 
Bulgaria February 1991 
Russia January 1992 
Source : National sources, EC Commission 
Month 1 
79.6 
25.8 
115.5 
250.0 
Month 2 
23.8 
7.1 
55.9 
38.0 
Month 3 
4.3 
4.7 
3.5 
n.a. -22-
Table  3:  Households  voluntary  and  involuntary  savings,  1  989-9  1,  USSR 
(end-year  values I 
1989  1990 
Households'  financial  assets 
- Cash  holdings  105,0 
- Savings  deposits  340,5 
- Frozen  compensation  for  price  rises  ( 1 ) 
- Other  fin.  assets  52,6 
- Total  498,1 
Of  which  : 
- Voluntary  savings  363,5 
- Involuntary  savings  ("overhang")  (2)  134,7 
Real  value  of  assets  ( 1989  prices) 
- Cash  holdings  105,0 
- Saving  deposits  340,5 
- Total  assets  498,1 
Inflation  rate  (Dec/Dec) 
Consumer  price  index  100,0 
- Households'  savings 
- Compensation  for  price  rises  ( 1 ) 
- Total 
- Increase  in  financial  assets 
- Stock-flow  adjustment 
Source  :  IMF  and  at.  0991 ),  Gosbank,  Press  reports,  authors'  estimates 
( 1 )  25%  of  the  compensation  was  unfrozen  in  1991 
(2)  IMF  estimate 
130,9 
386,2 
52,7 
569,8 
399,8 
170,0 
119,0 
351 '1 
518,0 
10,0 
110,0 
71,7 
1991  e 
263,0 
549,4 
117,0 
52,7 
982,1 
97,6 
203,9 
364,4 
145,0 
269,5 
280,0 
156,0 
~ 
3 
7 -23-
Table  4:  Potential  cost  for  individual  republics  of  a  disruption  of  trade  links 
with  the  rest  of  the  rouble  zone 
Republic  loss 
roub.  bn  %  of 
Armenia  2917,2 
Azerbaijan  3962,5 
Belarus  13869,4 
Estonia  2093,1 
Georgia  3665,3 
Kazakhstan  3358,5 
Kirgizia  1914,3 
Latvia  3649,8 
Lithuania  4114,8. 
Moldova  3467,1 
Russia  44167,7 
Tajikistan  1519,2 
Turkmenistan  1326,7 
Ukraine  24775,2 
Uzbekistan  5514,9 
Source : Calculations with Goskomstat data for 1989 
Notes: 
Russia's  loss 
NMP  roub.  bn  %  of  NMP 
50,3  1043,9  0,3 
36,4  1961,8  0,5 
52,9  4715,5  1,2 
51,1  737,9  0,2 
35,9  1835,8  0,5 
12,5  4841,5  1,3 
38,3  899,9  0,2 
52,1  1259,9  0,3 
46,2  1601,8  0,4 
45,0  1385,9  0,4 
11,5  - -
31,7  863,9  0,2 
28,2  845,9  0,2 
24,2  18448,2  4,8 
26,6  3725,6  1,0 
Republic  loss 
/  Russia's  loss 
2,8 
2,0 
2,9 
2,8 
2,0 
0,7 
2,1 
2,9 
2,6 
2,5 
-
1,8 
1,6 
1,3 
1,5 
Republic loss is measured by exports of 'soft goods' to the rest of the rouble zone 
Russian loss is measured by Russia's exports of 'soft goods' to the state 
Calculation of  Russia's loss is based on the assumption that exports are distributed according to states NMPs 
Finished manufactures, services, 50 % of  chemicals and 50% of  food products are considered soft goods -24-
Table  5=  Lending  rates  in  January  1992 
Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Moscow  28,4  7,2 
Other  Russia  23,8  7,2 
Other  CIS  18,7  5,7 
Baltic  states  29,9  10,2 
Source : calculations with a data on individual bank lending 
rates published in Commersant,  10 February 1992. -25-
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